キット・クラレンバーグ；：暴露されたUSAIDの関与

暴露されたUSAIDの関与（2019年以降）
内部文書から、米政府機関USAIDが「ヴァレント・プロジェクツ」という民間情報操作会社を通じて、スーダンの暫定政府を守るためにオンライン批判を検閲・抑制していたことが明らかになった。
この暫定政権は米国が支援して成立した「傀儡政権」とされ、多くの国民から反発を受けていた。

情報操作の仕組みと資金の流れ
USAID傘下の一時的な支援部門OTIは、スーダン政府と密に連携し、メディアオフィスを設立して“プロパガンダ”の発信と誤情報対策を主導。
OTIはヴァレントに100万ドル以上を支払い、FacebookやInstagram上の大量アカウントの削除にも関与。
ただし、ヴァレントの公式帳簿にはこの資金は記載されていないという。

心理戦のプロと“デモクラシーの仮面”
ヴァレント代表アミル・カーン氏は元々シリア戦争中にCIA・MI6支援の過激派のプロパガンダを担当していた人物。
現在はウクライナ戦争でも情報操作を支援しており、イギリス国防省の“プロジェクト・アルケミー”とも連携。
スーダンと同様、ターゲット国の世論や認知に影響を与えるため、特定の“オーディエンス”を選定して物語を流し込む手法を採用していた。

“デモクラシー支援”の裏にある不穏な構造
イギリス外務省が管理する“PFRU”という基金を通じ、ヴァレントはウクライナ政府とも連携。
ロシア国内およびインド・トルコなどの国民の心理や態度に影響を与えるための戦略的情報戦を提案。
過去にシリアでも類似のプロジェクト“Aurelius”を実施し、ロシアの軍事介入を国内世論で揺さぶる試みをしていた。

ヴァレントの“ロシア系”浸透戦略
- ウクライナ拠点の“ロシア系活動家チーム”が、ロシア国内の反体制ソーシャルメディア構築を担当
- 「外国ジャーナリストに繋がりのある活動家」も動員され、ロシア主流メディアへの潜在的な浸透ルートを確保
- 資金は“裕福なシリア人”による寄付とされるが、実態はウクライナ登録のロシア系団体への送金ルートらしい（実質的な資金洗浄とも見える構造）

“オーディエンスの信頼度測定”という名のターゲティング研究
- トムソン・ロイター財団がヴァレントに委託し、ウクライナの独立系メディア188件を分析
- “ナショナリストおばあちゃん”から“ロシア第一主義者”“プラウドボーイズ系”まで4分類で受容層を把握
- 最も信頼されている情報源は“セレブ系ブロガー”、メディア大手は「オリガルヒの代弁者」とみなされて不信感あり

メディア戦略の提案内容が“プロパガンダ設計図”すぎる
- 「実在の個人」を中心にメディア展開し、部族主義（＝排他的な視点）を避ける
- ロシア文化や歴史への“敬意”を示しつつ政策批判を行え、と“印象操作”を助言
- 全プラットフォームに連携してコンテンツを配置、“中心となる物語”に集約せよ、とも

TRF過去案件が意味深すぎる
- 2013年のエジプト軍事クーデター時、英国情報機関が支援した反体制メディア“Aswat Masriya”の設立に関与
- 同様のメディアをウクライナ2019年選挙前に仕込もうとしていた痕跡あり
- 表向きは「健全な選挙報道の支援」でも、選挙結果に影響を与える意図があった可能性濃厚

戦争への“世論整備”の疑念も
- 2021年3月、ゼレンスキーがクリミア・ドンバスの「奪還戦略」を発表
- 直後に軍が東南部へ集結 → 2022年の対露衝突の前兆
- TRFとヴァレントによる“独立系メディア調査”がこの直前に完了


Leaked files expose how notorious intelligence cutout USAID secretly employed the services of shady “counter-disinformation” firm Valent Projects, to censor and suppress online criticism of an illegitimate puppet government Washington installed in Sudan in August 2019. The purpose was to shore up its brutal, corrupt rule in the face of widespread public opposition. The documents suggest this was not the only country where Valent has been used as a cutout to support Western destabilisation and intervention, both covert and overt.

A since-deleted USAID web entry declared the April 2019 ouster of Sudan’s longtime leader Omar al-Bashir represented a “historic” opportunity “to further US interests in Sudan and the region.” The Agency’s now-defunct Office of Transition Services (OTI), which provided “fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition” - in other words, regime change - engaged in “close cooperation” with “key ministries” within the interim Sudanese government established four months later. This included creating and managing multiple state “media offices” for disseminating propaganda, and countering “mis- and disinformation”. 


The leaks show Valent reaped over $1 million from OTI for “counter disinformation and communications support” in Sudan. Suspiciously, this staggering sum is not reflected in the company’s official accounts. Nonetheless, some detail on its OTI work is provided by a June 2021 Meta report on “coordinated inauthentic behavior”. It states a malign network of 53 Facebook accounts, 51 pages, three groups, and 18 Instagram users in Sudan were removed “after reviewing information about some of its activity shared by researchers at Valent Projects.”

In October 2021, Valent chief Amil Khan told Reuters the “inauthentic” Sudanese “network” his company identified was in fact “three times larger” than the nexus removed by Facebook in June that year, “attracting more than 6 million followers and continuing to grow.” He accused Meta of failing to act appropriately. By contrast, administrators of pages fingered by Valent as “inauthentic” emphatically denied the charge, telling Reuters the accusations stemmed from their criticism of the interim government’s “oppressive policies and poor economic and political management.”

Sudan’s deeply unpopular OTI-run government collapsed the same month. During its two years of operation, it gained a woeful reputation for industrial scale corruption, savage attacks on dissidents, banning opposition news outlets, jailing dissidents without charge or trial, and other egregious abuses of power. Evidently, Valent was seeking to systematically defenestrate any and all online detractors of Washington’s faithful puppet on USAID’s dime, in a country where social media is highly influential on public perceptions and actions.


The Sudanese military seizes power, October 2021
‘Measurable Effects’

Publicly, Valent Projects presents a friendly, democratic face, its in-house ‘experts’ frequently quoted in the mainstream on topics ranging from carbon emission “disinformation” to whether rapper Kendrick Lamar has been promoted by an online bot network. Yet, Khan cut his teeth running propaganda and influence operations for murderous CIA and MI6-backed extremist groups during the Syrian dirty war. The USAID leaks make abundantly clear he remains up to his old tricks, under Valent’s banner.

Khan’s reprehensible professional background made him an ideal candidate for managing “information operations” in support of the Ukraine proxy war, from the perspective of Project Alchemy. A British Ministry of Defence-created cell of military and intelligence veterans, it is charged with keeping Kiev “fighting at all costs”, plotting oft-suicidal missions for Ukrainian forces to carry out. Questions thus abound as to whether Khan’s secret plot with celebrity ‘journalist’ Paul Mason to destroy The Grayzone, exposed in June 2022, arose from his clandestine mission for Alchemy.

Dubbing him a “ninja” in the field of psychological warfare, Alchemy chiefs approached Khan in April 2022, inviting him to lead their “information” effort in the proxy war. He responded that Valent was already collaborating with Chemonics International, which manages the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine. Set up by Western governments to funnel support of all kinds to Kiev, PFRU is now run by the British Foreign Office, in direct “collaboration” with Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration.

Khan explained the project was concerned with “tracking pro-Russian disinfo targeting key audiences in key countries…with the aim of influencing policy in a pro-Russian direction,” and countering attempts “to turn key audiences against the idea of support for Ukraine.” He bragged how Valent had “past performance in identifying, monitoring and closing such activity.” Khan enquired of Alchemy, “would something like that be of interest?”

Not long after this email exchange, Valent submitted a pitch to PFRU. The firm proposed to “map audiences critical to the Kremlin’s efforts, and identify opportunities to impact their narratives,” thus supporting Kiev’s “strategic communications efforts.” If successful, Ukrainian officials would be provided with “a stream of ‘narrative opportunities’” to “influence” and “engage” audiences not only in Russia, but “other key states” including India and Turkey, via news outlets, social media, and other information sources.

“One strand” of the project would “focus on mapping Russian internal audiences critical to the Kremlin’s plans with the aim of identifying opportunities to influence.” This would, it was projected, increase Kiev’s ability “to affect measurable attitudinal and behavioural change amongst key Russian audiences.” Meanwhile, “Russia’s ability to politically absorb negative conflict-related impacts,” such as “manpower losses” and “economic damage”, would be “degraded.”


Valent Projects’ pitch to PFRU
The operation’s “second strand” would identify and monitor “social media networks delivering Russian information operations” overseas. Analysing the “content” and “engagement patterns” of these purported “networks” would “produce streams of highly specific, time sensitive information designed to present [Ukrainian] stakeholders opportunities to achieve influence.” The document bragged that “the approach and specific methodologies outlined” therein were “based on work [Valent Projects] has already conducted for multiple donors with measurable effects.”

While no examples are cited in the leaked file, an obvious candidate would be Project Aurelius. This was an information warfare effort waged while Khan was based in Amman, Turkey, base of operations for a variety of British intelligence cutouts, with which he was employed during the Syrian dirty war. It sought to undermine Russia’s military support of Damascus, and Vladimir Putin’s rule, by “exposing Russians to the complicated reality their government” faced in the country.


The Project’s leaked outline claimed “Russia’s position in Syria is more costly and less successful than the Kremlin is admitting,” and Putin’s position domestically and internationally was “fragile”. The objective therefore was to present Russia’s Syria intervention “as depicted” in British intelligence-created and run Syrian opposition media outlets “to key Russian audiences, including mainstream news consumers.” This “mechanism” could easily be constructed by “[tasking] Syrian opposition media activists” ? in other words, British assets ? “to capture raw material that undermines Russian claims.”

    
Project Aurelius
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The Project reportedly already had “potential points of entry into Russian mainstream media,” a team of “Russian activists based in Ukraine with access to foreign journalists and opinion influencers with media profiles,” and “activists able to establish and run Russian social media pages,” including “Russian opposition social media networks.” Funding would appear to come from a “Syrian-run media activist group”, ostensibly financed by “donations from wealthy Syrians”, which would send funds to a “a Russian-run similar entity…registered in Ukraine.”

‘Particularly Problematic’

Another leaked Valent file shows the firm was employed by Thomson Reuters Foundation, the world-famous news agency’s “charitable” wing, “to gauge audience trust levels towards independent media in Ukraine.” The firm conducted extensive analysis of 188 separate news outlets in Kiev, operating “across a variety of platforms, from websites to Facebook pages and Telegram channels.” It identified four separate audiences; “nationalist grannies”; “tech-savvy professionals”; “Russia First fans”; and “Ukrainian ‘Proud Boys’”, referencing the far-right US militia. The findings were delivered in March 2021.


Excerpt from leaked Valent Projects file
Valent found “the most trusted information sources” in Ukraine “tend to be individuals who could best be described as ‘celebrity bloggers’,” as “larger media outlets…are assumed to be promoting an oligarch’s interests.” Those “celebrity bloggers” who could “communicate a certain comfort level with Russian culture and language while maintaining a dispassionate but critical tone on Kremlin policy” were concluded to be “the most likely actors in the Ukrainian information space to attract the widest cross section of audiences.”

Such was the depth of Valent’s research, the firm was “confident” in making a number of “recommendations to news outlets operating in the Ukrainian information environment.” This included developing outlets “around real-world personalities,” avoiding “the appearance of narrow tribalism,” and “[showing] respect to Russian culture and history” when “criticising Russian policy.” Meanwhile, “long-form content” should focus on “newsworthy interviews”, with outlets posting “appropriate content” across platforms “in an integrated manner around a central narrative…[tailored] to audience profiles.”

It is uncertain why Thomson Reuters Foundation commissioned Valent to identify the most popular independent media outlets and personalities, and effective propaganda strategies, in Ukraine. Nonetheless, The Grayzone has previously revealed the Foundation groomed a secret army of pro-Western Russian journalists under a covert Foreign Office operation, to “weaken the Russian state’s influence”. More gravely, this journalist has also exposed how Reuters and TRF created a British intelligence-funded astroturf opposition media outlet in Egypt, Aswat Masriya, which was central to Cairo’s brutal 2013 military coup.


Thomson Reuters Foundation proposes creating astroturf ‘'independent’ media outlet for Ukraine’s 2019 elections
Strikingly, leaked TRF files related to that project proposed repeating the exercise in Ukraine, “timed for the run up to the 2019 elections.” This was ostensibly spurred by “a lack of in-depth, independent news coverage,” which the Foundation considered “particularly problematic at key political junctures such as elections, especially when vested interests seek to influence particular outcomes.” In this context, the timing of Valent’s research effort for TRF is rendered rather suspect.

In March 2021, Zelensky issued a decree, outlining a “strategy for the de-occupation and reintegration” of “temporarily occupied territory” in Crimea and Donbass. It sketched a blueprint for hot war to recapture both territories. Immediately, Kiev’s forces began massing in the south and east of Ukraine, a key precursor to the proxy conflict that erupted in February 2022. Perhaps Zelensky’s British backers wished to ensure in advance local “independent” media figures and outlets were supportive of the President’s “strategy” to ignite war with Russia?